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Multiparty simultaneous quantum identity authentication based on entanglement
swapping
Jian Wang,∗ Quan Zhang, and Chao-jing Tang
School of Electronic Science and Engineering,
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We present a multiparty simultaneous quantum identity authentication protocol based on entan-
glement swapping. In our protocol, the multi-user can be authenticated by a trusted third party
simultaneously.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum cryptography has been one of the most re-
markable applications of quantum mechanics in quantum
information science. Quantum key distribution (QKD),
which provides a way of exchanging a private key with
unconditional security, has progressed rapidly since the
first QKD protocol was proposed by Benneett and Bras-
sard in 1984 [1]. A good many of other quantum commu-
nication schemes have also been proposed and pursued,
such as quantum secret sharing (QSS)[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7],
quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25] and quan-
tum identity authentication (QIA) [22, 23, 24, 25]. QSS
is the generalization of classical secret sharing to quan-
tum scenario and can share both classical and quantum
messages among sharers. QSDC’s object is to transmit
the secret message directly without first establishing a
key to encrypt it. Authentication is a well-studied area
of classical cryptography, including identity and message
authentication. QIA aims to generalize classical identity
authentication to quantum scenario for providing uncon-
ditional security. Dueˇk et al. [22] proposed a secure
quantum identification system combining a classical iden-
tification procedure and quantum key distribution. Zeng
and Zhang [23] put forward a quantum key verification
scheme which can simultaneously distribute the quantum
secret key and verify the communicators’ identity. T. Mi-
hara [24] presented three quantum identification schemes
by using entangled state and unitary operation. Lee et
al. [25] presented two QSDC protocols with user authen-
tication.
In this paper, we present a multiparty simultaneous
quantum identity authentication protocol based on en-
tanglement swapping, which combines the idea in Ref.
[21] with that in Ref. [25]. In our protocol, We sup-
pose a trusted third party, Trent, authenticates r legal
users, {Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicer} simultaneously. Sim-
ilar to Ref. [25], Trent shares a secret identity num-
ber IDi (i = 1, 2, · · · , r) and a secret hash function hi
(i = 1, 2, · · · , r) with each user. Here the hash function
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is defined as
h : {0, 1}l × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n, (1)
where l, m and n denote the length of the identity num-
ber, the length of a counter and the length of authenti-
cation key, respectively. Thus the user’s authentication
key can be expressed as AK = h(ID,C), where C is the
counter of calls on the user’s hash function. When the
length of the authentication key is not enough to satisfy
the requirement of cryptographic task. The parties can
increase the counter and then generates a new authenti-
cation key. We denote the authentication keys of Alice1,
Alice2, · · · , Alicer as AKA1 = hA1(IDA1 , CA1), AKA2 =
hA2(IDA2 , CA2), · · · , AKAr = hAr (IDAr , CAr ), respec-
tively.
Entanglement swapping can entangle two quantum
systems that do not have direct interaction with each
other [26]. It plays an important role in quantum infor-
mation. We first describe entanglement swapping simply.
The four Bell states are
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉),
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). (2)
Suppose two distant parties, Alice and Bob, share |φ+12〉
and |φ+34〉 where Alice has qubits 1 and 4, and Bob pos-
sesses 2 and 3. Note that
|φ+12〉 ⊗ |φ+34〉 =
1
2
(|φ+14〉|φ+23〉+ |φ−14〉|φ−23〉
+|ψ+14〉|ψ+23〉+ |ψ−14〉|ψ−23〉. (3)
After Bell basis measurement on qubits 1 and 4, the state
of the qubits 1, 2, 3, 4 collapses to |φ+14〉|φ+23〉, |φ−14〉|φ−23〉,
|ψ+14〉|ψ+23〉 and |ψ−14〉|ψ−23〉 each with probability 1/4. If
Alice and Bob share other Bell states, similar results can
be achieved.
In our protocol, the eight three-particle GHZ states are
2defined as
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉), |Ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉),
|Ψ3〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉+ |011〉), |Ψ4〉 = 1√
2
(|100〉 − |011〉),
|Ψ5〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉+ |101〉), |Ψ6〉 = 1√
2
(|010〉 − |101〉),
|Ψ7〉 = 1√
2
(|110〉+ |001〉), |Ψ8〉 = 1√
2
(|110〉 − |001〉),
(4)
which form a complete orthonormal basis. The parties
agree that the two unitary operations
I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|, (5)
can be encoded into one bit classical information as
I → 0, iσy → 1. (6)
We first present our QIA protocol with two users
(Alice1, Alice2) and then generalize it to the case with
many users (Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicer). Each user shares
a authentication key with Trent, as we have described
above.
(S1) Trent prepares an ordered N three-particle GHZ
states, each of which is in the state |Ψ1〉 = 1√2 (|000〉 +
|111〉)TA1A2 , where the subscripts T , A1 and A2 repre-
sent the three particles of each GHZ state. Trent takes
particle T (A1, A2) for each state to form an ordered par-
ticle sequence, called T (A1, A2) sequence. He then sends
A1 and A2 sequences to Alice1 and Alice2, respectively
and keeps T sequence.
(S2) To ensure the security of the quantum channel,
the parties check eavesdropping as follows: (a) After
hearing from the users, Trent selects randomly a suf-
ficiently large subset from the ordered N GHZ states.
(b) He measures the sampling particles in T sequence,
in a random measuring basis, Z-basis(|0〉,|1〉) or X-basis
(|+〉= 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉= 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)). (c) Trent an-
nounces publicly the positions of the sampling particles
and the measuring basis for each of the sampling parti-
cles. Alice1 (Alice2) measures the sampling particles in
A1 (A2) sequence, in the same measuring basis as Trent.
After measurements, the users publishes their measure-
ment results. (d) Trent can then check the existence of
eavesdropper by comparing their measurement results. If
the channel is safe, their results must be completely cor-
related. When Trent performs Z-basis measurement on
his particle, Alices’ result should be |00〉 (|11〉) if Trent’s
result is |0〉 (|1〉). On the contrary, Alices’ result should
be |++〉 or | − −〉 (|+−〉 or | −+〉) if Trent performs
X-basis measurement on his particle and gets the result
|+〉 (|−〉). (e) If Trent confirms that their results are
completely correlated, he announces publicly his mea-
surement results of the sampling particles. The users
can make certain whether they share a sequence of GHZ
states with Trent. If the users confirms that there is no
eavesdropping, they continue to execute the next step.
Otherwise, they inform Trent and abort the communica-
tion.
(S3) After hearing from the users, Trent divides ran-
domly the remaining GHZ states into M ordered groups,
{P(1)TA1A2 , Q(1)T ′A′1A′2}, {P(2)TA1A2 , Q(2)T ′A′1A′2},· · · , {P(M)TA1A2 , Q(M)T ′A′1A′2}, where 1, 2, · · · , M rep-
resent the order of the group and the subscripts T and
T ′ (A1, A′1 and A2, A
′
2) denote the particles belonging
to Trent (Alice1’s and Alice2’s ).
(S4) For each of the groups, Alice1 (Alice2) performs
one of the two operations {I, iσy} on particle A1 (A2)
according to her authentication key, AKA1 (AKA2). For
example, if the ith value of AKA1 is 0 (1), Alice1 ex-
ecutes I (iσy) operation on particle A1. As we have
described above, here AKA1 = h(IDA1 , CA1), AKA2 =
h(IDA2 , CA2). If the length of AK is not long enough to
M , new AK can be generated by increasing the counter
until the length of AK is no less than M . They inform
Trent that they have transformed their qubit by using
unitary operation according to their authentication keys.
(S5) After hearing from the users, Trent performs ran-
domly I or iσy operation on particles T in each group.
After the three-party’s operations, |Ψ1〉 can be trans-
formed into one of the eight three-particle GHZ states
{|Ψ1〉, |Ψ1〉, · · · , |Ψ8〉}, as shown in Table 1.
TABLE I: The transformation relations of GHZ states
unitary operations performed on the three paticles
|Ψ1〉 I ⊗ I ⊗ I
|Ψ2〉 iσy ⊗ iσy ⊗ iσy
|Ψ3〉 I ⊗ iσy ⊗ iσy
|Ψ4〉 iσy ⊗ I ⊗ I
|Ψ5〉 iσy ⊗ I ⊗ iσy
|Ψ6〉 I ⊗ iσy ⊗ I
|Ψ7〉 iσy ⊗ iσy ⊗ I
|Ψ8〉 I ⊗ I ⊗ iσy
(S6) Trent lets Alice1 (Alice2) measure particles A1
and A′1 (A2 and A
′
2) of each group in Bell basis. After
measurements, Alice1 and Alice1 publish their measure-
ment results. Trent performs Bell basis measurement on
particles T and T ′ of each group and authenticates the
users according to their measurement results. We then
explain it in detail. The state of a group can be written
3as
|Ψ1〉TA1A2 ⊗ |Ψ1〉T ′A′1A′2 =
1
2
√
2
(|φ+TT ′ 〉|φ+A1A′1〉|φ
+
A2A
′
2
〉
+|φ+TT ′〉|φ−A1A′1〉|φ
−
A2A
′
2
〉
+|φ−TT ′〉|φ+A1A′1〉|φ
−
A2A
′
2
〉+ |φ−TT ′ 〉|φ−A1A′1〉|φ
+
A2A
′
2
〉
+|ψ+TT ′〉|ψ+A1A′1〉|ψ
+
A2A
′
2
〉+ |ψ+TT ′ 〉|ψ−A1A′1〉|ψ
−
A2A
′
2
〉
+|ψ−TT ′〉|ψ+A1A′1〉|ψ
−
A2A
′
2
〉+ |ψ−TT ′〉|ψ−A1A′1〉|ψ
+
A2A
′
2
〉).
(7)
If Trent’s random operation is iσy, Alice1’s ith value of
her authentication key is 1 which corresponds to opera-
tion iσy and Alice2’s ith value of her authentication key is
0 corresponding to operation I, |Ψ1〉TA1A2 is then trans-
formed to |Ψ7〉TA1A2 and the state of the group becomes
|Ψ7〉TA1A2 ⊗ |Ψ1〉T ′A′1A′2 =
1
2
√
2
(|ψ+TT ′〉|ψ+A1A′1〉|φ
+
A2A
′
2
〉
−|ψ+TT ′〉|ψ−A1A′1〉|φ
−
A2A
′
2
〉
−|ψ−TT ′〉|ψ+A1A′1〉|φ
−
A2A
′
2
〉+ |ψ−TT ′〉|ψ−A1A′1〉|φ
+
A2A
′
2
〉
+|φ+TT ′〉|φ+A1A′1〉|ψ
+
A2A
′
2
〉 − |φ+TT ′〉|φ−A1A′1〉|ψ
−
A2A
′
2
〉
−|φ−TT ′〉|φ+A1A′1〉|ψ
−
A2A
′
2
〉+ |φ−TT ′〉|φ−A1A′1〉|ψ
+
A2A
′
2
〉).
(8)
From the published results of Alice1 and Alice2 and his
measurement results, Trent can obtain the users’ oper-
ation information and then authenticates the users be-
cause the three parties’ results correspond to an exclu-
sive state. For example, the results of Trent, Alice1
and Alice2 are each |ψ−TT ′〉, |ψ−A1A′1〉 and |φ
+
A2A
′
2
〉. Ac-
cording to Eq. (8), the state of the group must be
|Ψ7〉TA1A2⊗|Ψ1〉T ′A′1A′2 . Trent then knows the ith value
of Alice1’s and Alice2’s authentication keys are each 1
and 0 because only the operation iσy ⊗ iσy ⊗ I applied
on particles T , A1 and A2 can change the state |Ψ1〉
into |Ψ7〉. Trent compares his deduced result with the
authentication key they shared and then authenticates
Alice1 and Alice2.
Now let us discuss the security for the present protocol.
An eavesdropper, Eve, has little chance to eavesdrop the
users’ operation information because it is unnecessary for
the users to resend their particles on which each of users
has performed their corresponding operations according
to their authentication keys, to the trusted third party.
Moreover, from the published results of the users, Eve
also cannot obtain any information of the users because
she has no Trent’s result. Suppose the published results
of Alice1 and Alice2 are each |ψ−A1A′1〉 and |φ
+
A2A
′
2
〉. With-
out Trent’s result, Eve can only know that the state of
the group is one of the four state {|Ψ5〉⊗|Ψ1〉, |Ψ6〉⊗|Ψ1〉,
|Ψ7〉⊗|Ψ1〉, |Ψ8〉⊗|Ψ1〉}. The eavesdropping check aims
to prevent Eve from impersonating attack and let the le-
gal users share a safe quantum channel with Trent. Sup-
pose Eve prepares N ordered three-particles GHZ states,
each of which is |Ψ1〉 = 1√2 (|000〉+ |111〉)FE1E2 . Eve in-
tercepts particles A1 and A2 and resends particles E1 and
E2 to each Alice1 and Alice2. Eve attempts to personate
Trent for acquiring the users’ authentication key. How-
ever, during the eavesdropping check, Eve’s attack will
be detected by the parties because Eve cannot tamper
with the classical message published by the trusted third
party, Trent. Thus the users’ results have no correlation
with the result published by Trent.
According to Stinespring dilation theorem, Eve’s ac-
tion can be realized by a unitary operation Eˆ on a large
Hilbert space, HA1A2 ⊗ HE . Then the state of Trent,
Alice1, Alice1 and Eve is
|Φ〉 =
∑
T,A1,A2∈{0,1}
|εT,A1,A2〉|T 〉|A1A2〉, (9)
where |ε〉 denotes Eve’s probe state and |T 〉 and |A1A2〉
are states shared by Trent and the users. The condition
on the states of Eve’s probe is
∑
T,A1,A2∈{0,1}
〈εT,A1,A2 | εT,A1,A2〉 = 1. (10)
As Eve can eavesdrop particle A1 and A2, Eve’s action
on the system can be written as
|Φ〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉(α1|00〉|ε000〉+ β1|01〉|ε001〉+ γ1|10〉|ε010〉
+ δ1|11〉|ε011〉) + |1〉(δ2|11〉|ε100〉+ γ2|10〉|ε101〉
+ β2|01〉|ε110〉+ α2|00〉|ε111〉]. (11)
The error rate introduced by Eve is ǫ = 1 − |α1|2 =
1− |δ2|2. Here the complex numbers α, β, γ and δ must
satisfy EˆEˆ† = I.
We then generalize our three-party QIA protocol to
a multiparty one (more than three parties) (MQIA).
In MQIA protocol, Trent can authenticate many users,
{Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicer} (r > 2) simultaneously.
Trent prepares an ordered N (r+1)-particle GHZ states
1√
2
(|00 · · · 0〉+ |11 · · ·1〉)T,A1,··· ,Ar . (12)
The details of MQIA is very similar to those of three-
party one. Trent sends A1, A2, · · · , Ar sequences
to each Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicer. Similar to step
(S2), Trent and the users check eavesdropping. If
they confirm the quantum channel is safe, they con-
tinue to the next step. Otherwise, they abort the pro-
tocol. Trent divides the remaining GHZ states into
M ordered groups, [{P(1)TA1···Ar , Q(1)T ′A′1···A′r}, · · · ,{P(M)TA1···Ar , Q(M)T ′A′1···A′r}]. Alice1, Alice2, · · · ,
Alice(r−1) each perform one of the two operations {I,
iσy} on their particles according to their authentication
keys. Trent then performs randomly I or iσy operation
on particle T in each group. Each user measures par-
ticles Ai and A
′
i (i = 1, 2, · · · , r) of each group in Bell
basis. After measurements, Alice1, Alice2, · · · , Alicer
4publish their measurement results. Trent performs Bell
basis measurement on particles T and T ′ of each group
and authenticates the users according to their measure-
ment results.
In summary, we have presented a multiparty simulta-
neous quantum identity authentication protocol based on
entanglement swapping. The trusted third party can au-
thenticate many users simultaneously. If there are many
users waiting for being authenticated by the system, the
efficiency for identity authentication can be improved
greatly.
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